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ABSTRACTThis paper is inspired by the observation that the social norm approach (SNA) to socially desirable behaviour change – that is, telling people about what lots of other people do – retains something of a Cinderella role among social marketing practitioners and academics. Thus, the objective of this paper is to bring the social norm approach to the attention of a wider – and specifically, marketing and social marketing – audience, in the hope that the practice, study and critical analysis of the approach can be widened and deepened. We begin this task by tracing the background of the social norm approach to its origins in psychology and social psychology and by discussing a number of typical social norm campaigns. Thereafter, we review four key characteristics of successful social norm campaigns. In our discussion, we return to a more theoretical discussion of how the social norm approach works, and we pose a number of questions that emerge from the paper. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Der Autor geht in seinem Beitrag davon aus, daß wir in der real existierenden maschinellen Technik einen gesellschaftlichen Realitätsbereich haben, der weder in "Natur" noch "Handeln" auflösbar ist. Er sucht eine Annäherung an gegenständliche Technik und damit ihre Implikationen für gesellschaftliche Entwicklung über die Kategorie "technische Normen" zu bewerkstelligen. Folgende Fragen sind dabei leitend: Wie kann man technische Normen soziologisch bestimmen? Kann man vermeiden, das, was "technische Systeme von selbst tun", soziologisch auszublenden oder als nicht-sozial auszuklammern? Fazit seiner Ausführungen ist, daß technische Systeme am besten als externalisierte, in die naturale Basis des gesellschaftlichen Prozesses eingeschriebene soziale Strukturen aufzufassen sind. Wichtig ist weiterhin der Sachverhalt, daß Komplexe von Gerätschaften in der Regel immer gleichzeitig in sehr vielen menschlichen Handlungszusammenhängen vorkommen. Der Aufdeckung dieser "multiplen Integriertheit technischer Systeme" dient die Analyse technischer Normen als die "institutionelle Struktur von Maschinerien". (BE)

What is the role of law in a society in which order is maintained mostly through social norms, trust, and nonlegal sanctions? Eric Posner argues that social norms are sometimes desirable yet sometimes odious, and that the law is critical to enhancing good social norms and undermining bad ones. But he also argues that the proper regulation of social norms is a delicate and complex task, and that current understanding of social norms is inadequate for guiding judges and lawmakers. What is needed, and what this book offers, is a model of the relationship between law and social norms. The model shows that people's concern with establishing cooperative relationships leads them to engage in certain kinds of imitative behavior. The resulting behavioral patterns are called social norms. Posner applies the model to several areas of law that involve the regulation of social norms, including laws governing gift-giving and nonprofit organizations; family law; criminal law; laws governing speech, voting, and discrimination; and contract law. Among the engaging questions posed are: Would the legalization of gay marriage harm traditional married couples? Is it beneficial to shame criminals? Why should the law reward those who make charitable contributions? Would people vote more if non-voters were penalized? The author approaches these questions using the tools of game theory, but his arguments are simply stated and make no technical demands on the reader

Social norms, as a topic of inquiry, has garnered significant attention from a variety of perspectives in recent years. Because of the rapidly-growing interest in social norms from scholars in multiple disciplines, this area of scholarship is often characterized by a lack of clarity on what constitutes social norms and how key concepts are operationalized. The objectives of this article are to (a) provide a review of the fast-expanding literature on social norms, (b) delineate similarities and differences in key operational definitions, (c) review theories that explicate how norms affect behaviors, (d) propose a revised theoretical framework that helps organize our understanding of normative inf luence on behavior, and (e) provide suggestions for future research in this area. This review highlights the need to consider whether a behavior is enacted spontaneously or after deliberation. If the former, whichever attitude or norm is most salient will likely have a direct effect on behavior. If the latter, we propose that behavioral, individual, and contextual attributes will inf luence the extent to which norms shape behavioral intentions and subsequent behavior. Finally, this review highlights the need for more studies designed to test the causal relationship between social norms and behaviors, as well as those that study norms from a qualitative perspective.

In a norm game, under certain conditions, there exist Nash equilibria of mutual cooperation. Experimental work demonstrates that even in one-shot situations the level and proportion of cooperative behavior increases if an punishment option is available to the players of a public goods game. It is therefore important to analyze conditions such that this is consistent with a rational choice approach. The paper is meant as a first step toward this task. The main result will be that nonstandard assumptions about human motivations or preferences can explain norms with sanctions even in one-shot situations. This is shown by an analysis of the norm game with two well-known recent models of fairness from behavioral game theory.:Introduction; Cooperation in a norm game; Non-standard preferences in the one-shot norm game; Conclusions

This article shows that social norms are better explained as correlating devices for a correlated equilibrium of the underlying stage game, rather than Nash equilibria. Whereas the epistemological requirements for rational agents playing Nash equilibria are very stringent and usually implausible, the requirements for a correlated equilibrium amount to the existence of common priors, which we interpret as induced by the cultural system of the society in question. When the correlating device has perfect information, we need in addition only to posit that individuals obey the social norm when it is costless to do so. When the correlating device has incomplete information, the operation of the social norm requires that individuals have a predisposition to follow the norm even when this is costly. The latter case explains why social norms are associated with other-regarding preferences and provides a basis for analyzing honesty and corruption.